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The shadow of war - certainly the longest and darkest of all
shadows - has cast a pall on the celebrations taking place this
month to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of
Watson and Crick’s paper describing the double-helical
structure of DNA. It’s hard to be cheerful when the products
of scientific research are being used to kill other human
beings in the nominal quest for weapons of mass destruction
that are, likewise, the products of scientific research.
Regardless of one’s feeling about the validity, morally or
legally, of the war in Iraq, I would guess that most civilized
people (with the possible exception of some government offi-
cials in certain members of the Coalition of the Willing)
would agree that anytime war breaks out it represents a
failure of our collective efforts as a species to overcome our
instincts for violence, to evolve into something we can be
proud of.
Man isn’t the only species that wages war, of course. Ants,
for one, campaign ruthlessly and with great skill, and make
slaves of their defeated enemies. But man is certainly the
only species that wages war while agonizing about whether
it’s right to do so. The concept of the just war is largely
Judaeo-Christian. It is most completely set out in two trea-
tises many hundred of years old: The City of God, by Augustine
of Hippo, and the Summa Theologica of Thomas Aquinas.
Just war theory says that war can only be waged legitimately
if the following conditions are met. First, it is the last resort.
Second, it is waged by a legitimate authority. Third, it is
undertaken with a reasonable chance of success. Fourth, its
aim is to re-establish peace. Fifth, the suffering caused, or
thought likely to be caused, by the war must be less than the
suffering caused by leaving in place whatever evil you are
trying to correct - such as a despot on the throne (so, it is
waged only in proportion to the injury suffered). And sixth,
it must discriminate between combatants and non-combatants.
The Bush doctrine of preemptive war argues that expansion
of this theory is necessary because, as it has been put by
Chuck Colson (older readers may remember him from the
good old days of Watergate - well, he’s back) “waiting for the
other side to shoot first is tantamount to committing
national suicide.” That might be worth arguing about, but
it’s way too general. It implies that, for example, the US
would be morally justified in waging preemptive war
against anybody who has even the capacity to shoot first,
regardless of how likely it is that they actually ever would
(look out, England). 
My personal opinion is that the war in Iraq has big problems
with the first and second conditions, at least, but in any case
it seems clear to me that nearly all wars in human history
would have trouble satisfying these conditions. Perhaps the
outstanding exception is the Second World War (if we put
aside the Allied firebombing of Dresden and Tokyo, and the
atom-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where the sixth
condition was blatantly ignored). World War II is of more
than passing interest here, because this ‘just war’ gave rise to
the modern system of publicly supported scientific research.
Prior to 1945 nearly all scientists were doing either largely
applied research funded by industry or the military or basic
research funded chiefly out of their own pockets. Basic
research well into the twentieth century was the province of
the independently wealthy, like Robert Louis Stevenson’s
Dr Jeckyl. Government got into the business of funding
fundamental research in a big way after World War II for
two reasons: one is that Vanevar Bush, a science advisor to
the US President after the war, argued successfully that
science was, as he put it, “an endless frontier” that would
lead to a brighter future for all mankind. But we should
never forget that the other reason is that physicists (and to
some extent chemists) had shown dramatically during the
war that scientific research would also lead to bigger and
better weapons of mass destruction.
The end of the Cold War shook the physicists’ grip on the
reins of science policy. With the nuclear threat diminished it
was harder for them to argue for the huge chunks of money
that nuclear physics, in particular, requires, and their
counsel became less essential as well. Now biology is king,for a day anyway. Again, there are two reasons: one is because
biologists have argued successfully that basic biological
research will lead to a brighter future in terms of human
health. But the other reason is that biologists have also shown
that they too can make weapons of mass destruction.
Yet if the fiftieth anniversary of the double helix teaches us
anything it ought to be that great scientific discoveries are
almost never made in time of war or directly for the purpose
of war. Governments at war aren’t really interested in basic
research. The Manhattan Project, which produced the
atomic bomb, was the development side of ‘R&D’; the
research part was mostly done prior to 1940, for no purpose
other than to address fundamental questions about the
nature of matter. Watson and Crick would have had neither
the time nor the resources to inquire into the structure of
DNA if England had still been at war; in fact, Crick was
soured on physics and turned towards biology in part by his
military work during World War II. Great science is the
product of peace. It is a luxury that well-defended but funda-
mentally peaceful peoples allow themselves. It is not clear to
me that it can flourish in, for example, a society that adopts a
doctrine of preemptive warfare.
As is apparent from the reminiscences in Watson’s 1968
book ‘The Double Helix’, Watson and Crick didn’t only walk
into a pub and announce their discovery; they also published
their model for the structure of DNA because they believed it
was important that everyone know all about it. “The secret of
life”, as Francis Crick called it with characteristic modesty,
was met with a resounding yawn. (A similar chorus of yawns
greeted the announcement on April 14 that the draft
sequence of the human genome had now been converted
into a finished sequence with less than 0.01% error rate.
Why couldn’t the public genome project leaders have waited
a few days and timed their announcement for the exact fiftieth
anniversary of the Watson and Crick paper on April 25?
They then would have received the front-page coverage their
achievement - completion ahead of schedule and under
budget - surely deserves.) Almost no one referenced the
classic 1953 Nature paper for a considerable time. It was ten
years before Watson and Crick were awarded the Nobel Prize
(many discoveries of lesser importance have been so
rewarded in five). Yet eventually the structure of DNA did
what they knew it must do - transform biology into a molecular
science - because it was out there for anyone to look at and
think about. And so the direction of biology changed forever
for the right reason, because all of a sudden we understood
something we had never understood before.
Fear of bioterrorism is already threatening to erode our faith
in the free and open exchange of scientific information.
Massive increases in research funds for previously finan-
cially moribund fields such as microbiology and vaccine
development, given in the name of biodefense, are likely to
shift the direction of biological research for decades to come,
but it will not be because we understand something new but
because we are greedy and afraid. Some good things will
emerge from all this, no doubt, but it’s hard for me to be very
sanguine about the future at a time when war is almost
becoming respectable again. Well, happy anniversary anyway.
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